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Thomas Rathwell* A Comparative Analysis of the
Reforms in European Health
Care Systems
Most countries in Europe are at various stages in the process of reforming their
health care systems. Instead of different and more diverse systems emerging, the
health reform process has resulted in a convergence on "managed competition"
as the only acceptable means for delivering health care. After briefly describing
the historical context, this paper examines the nature and scope of the reform
process in Europe. The major features of the reforms are cost-containment and
a reduction in the role of the state. There have been few systematic attempts to
measure the extent to which expectations are being realized. The paper con-
cludes with an assessment of the likely effects of "reforms"on the health care map
of Europe.
La plupart des pays europ6ens se trouvent a des etapes diff6rentes duprocessus
de r6forme de leurs systemes de sante. Au lieu de d6velopper de nouveaux
systemes, le processus de r6forme s'estconcentr6surla -concurrence dirig6e',
comme seul moyen acceptable capable de sauver les systemes de sant6. Apres
une pr6sentation du contexte historique, la nature et la port6e de la r6forme en
Europe sont decrites. Les caracteristiques dominantes des r6formes semblent
6tre delimiter les coots etdiminuerle r6le de l'6tat. Ilya eupeu de tentatives pour
mesurer le degr6 de la realisation des attentes. En conclusion, /'article presente
une etude sur les implications que pourraient avoir de tels changements sur les
systemes de sant6 en Europe.
Introduction
Health care reform is not just an European phenomenon. Everywhere
countries are re-examining and reviewing the underlying objectives of
their health care systems with the purpose of creating a different approach
capable of delivering efficient and effective health care to all. Within
Europe the impetus for health care reforms arises from a variety of
factors. They include:
demographic - a combination of population growth rates, an increas-
ing and aging dependent base (people aged 65 and over) and a
shrinking producer base through rising unemployment and/or under-
employment;
* Dr. Thomas Rathwell is Director of the School of Health Services Administration,
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" morbidity - as populations age and medical advances continue a
greater proportion of health care resources is being devoted to chronic
health care problems;
" economic - a shrinking economy and its effect on the public sector
deficit is restricting the ability, and in some cases the will, of
governments to maintain expenditure on social welfare programmes,
including health care;
" technological developments - greater public awareness and expecta-
tions of the benefits of medical care which, along with the health -
related aspects of the recession, have given rise to an increase in
demand for health care; and
* cost escalation - collectively, the above factors have contributed to an
increase in spending on health care. Health sector inflation in most
European countries exceeds the average retail price index which, in
turn, has led to severe cost escalation.'
Thus most governments have reacted by seeking ways to curtail or reduce
health services expenditure or both.
In central and eastern Europe there is an additional factor behind the
reforms. It is the process of political reformation following the collapse
and fragmentation of the old Soviet system under which countries seek
to move from a centralized and highly rigid economic and political
structure to one that is essentially pluralistic. As a result, governments in
central and eastern Europe have embarked on a search for a new and
different structural paradigm for their health care systems.
The thesis advanced in this paper is that the health care reform process,
rather than leading to greater structural diversity across Europe, has
produced the opposite: a propensity for health systems reforms to
coalesce around the central tendency of the "health care market" or, more
precisely, "managed competition."
This paper begins by describing briefly the historical context which,
for the purpose of discussion, is taken to be pre-1989. It then explores, in
general terms, the various processes being pursued and their underlying
rationale. Finally there is an assessment of the emerging paradigm,
managed competition, and its implications for health care in Europe.
1. A. Green, An Introduction to Health Planning in Developing Countries (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992); R. B. Saltman & J. Figueras, eds., European Health Care Reforms:
Analysis of Current Strategies, European Series No. 72 (Copenhagen: World Health Organi-
zation, Regional Office for Europe, 1997) See in particular, chapter 1, "The Pressures for
Reform."
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I. A History of Divergence
The health care systems in Europe have, in many respects, been as varied
as the number of countries, though it is possible to group the various
country - specific systems according to three general and not mutually
exclusive models: Beveridge, Bismarck and Semashko.2 Table 1 shows
the countries of Europe classified according to their type of health care
system as of 1989. The main characteristics of each are outlined.
Beveridge - type health care systems or national health systems owe
their name to Sir William Beveridge, generally acknowledged as the
founder of the British National Health Service. They are financed through
taxation, their infrastructure is owned by the state and their operational
policies determined by the state. There is universal free access to care.
Services are managed and delivered for the most part by state employees,
doctors are either salaried employees or paid on the basis of capitation
fees, and most hospitals operate with an overall global budget or cash
limit.
Bismarck-type health care systems or health/social insurance systems
are rooted in late nineteenth century German social legislation introduced
by the then Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. In these systems health care
is financed through compulsory contributions by employers and employ-
ees. Funds are managed by non-governmental, non-profit agencies
established by statute for the purpose, and state regulations set the
parameters in which the agencies operate. These agencies, or 'sickness
funds' as they are often called, negotiate with hospitals and other
providers a 'budget' for services to be provided. The providers (hospitals)
are independent with many, but not all, not-for-profit. Health workers are
not state employees and most physicians are paid on a fee-for-service
basis.
Semashko health care systems or centralized health systems are the
dominant model for those countries of central and eastern Europe once
under the economic control of the former Soviet Union. This model of
health care incorporates the ideas of Semashko, a physician during the
early Soviet period who is credited with the development of free medical
care operating under tight central control. It has many similarities to the
Beveridge model but also has important differences. In essence, the key
features of the Semashko model are financing from the state budget,
centralized planning and control of all aspects of the health system, and
2. B. Majnoni d'Intignano, "Financing of Health Care in Europe" in C. Artundo,
C.Sakellarides & H. Vuori, eds., Health Care Reforms in Europe (Copenhagen & Madrid:
World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe & Ministry of Health and Consumer
Affairs, 1993) [hereinafter Health Care Reforms in Europe] at 33-55.
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free access for all. Facilities are owned by the state, all employees are
salaried, and there is no private health sector.' It is these latter two
elements in particular which distinguish the Semashko model from the
Beveridge.
It should be noted that notwithstanding the features specific to each
type, there is much variation between the countries listed under each
model heading. For instance, it is not uncommon to find countries which
have a health/social insurance system, to have part of the financing of the
system come from general taxation, instead of being wholly reliant on
income-related contributions.4 Moreover, even in national heath system
countries, user charges or co-payments for services such as dental care
and pharmaceuticals are often required for an essentially free service.
Nonetheless, despite these variations affecting the 'purity' of the models,
they all share a common concern. The perception among politicians and
much of the general public is that they have not been successful in
creating and maintaining a significantly healthy population.' Table 2,
drawing on selected health indicators, indicates that there is some
variation among the countries of Europe and that this variation exists not
only between the health system models but also within each model.
A crude and over-simplistic interpretation of the table suggests that
countries with the Bismarck model are marginally better that those with
the Beveridge model at protecting and improving the health of their
population, but this appears to come at an overall higher cost as measured
by gross domestic product (GDP). One of the factors contributing to the
higher cost of Bismarck type health care systems is that their pluralistic
nature results in greater transaction costs. The table also implies that the
efficiency and effectiveness of the Semashko model in improving health
status is considerably less than the other two types. This may be due in
part to the lower proportion of GDP, on average, that these countries
devote to health care costs.6
3. Although no private sector existed, most people were accustomed to making 'under the
table' payments, particularly to physicians, for routine treatment as well as for enhanced care.
See V. Borissov & T. Rathwell, "Heath Care Reform in Bulgaria: an initial appraisal" (1995)
42 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1501.
4. OECD, The Reform of Health Care: A Comparative Analysis of Seven OECD Countries,
Health Policy Study No. 2 (Paris: OECD, 1992).
5. This is the common message emerging from a variety of studies of health reform. See C.J.
Ham, R. Robinson & M. Benzeval, Health Check (London: King's Fund Institute, 1990);
OECD, The Reform of Health Care Systems: A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries (Paris:
OECD, 1994); supra note 4.
6. Space does not permit an in-depth discussion of the various means of financing health care.
For a detailed analysis of these from a European context, see Saltman & Figueras, supra note
1 at 79-202.
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II. The Road to Reform
The views of all the countries with Beveridge and Bismarck models of
health care is that their particular health systems face persistent prob-
lems in the financing and delivery of health care.' These problems, it
would appear, arise from remedial design flaws in the financing,
payment and regulation of the systems, in conjunction with inefficiency
and poor performance.8 Consequently, most governments in western
Europe have taken a political decision to reform their respective health
care systems. In central and eastern Europe health care reform is but one
aspect of the fallout arising from the collapse of state socialism and the
desire by the countries concerned to introduce systems designed to
emulate those of the established market economies. Dependence on
financial support and aid from the World Bank, the European Union and
country specific donors inevitably have pushed central and eastern
European countries towards a more pluralistic economic approach, and
this is especially the case for health sector reforms.9
Geographically, health system reform in Europe is a tale of two
halves: the countries of western Europe undertaking essentially strate-
gic structural adjustments to established systems; and, the countries of
central and eastern Europe carrying out wholesale changes to their
health care systems. In short, western European countries are re-
modelling their health care systems, whereas the countries of central and
eastern Europe are re-designing and re-building theirs. Re-modelling, in
this context, means that governments, though generally satisfied with
the overall structure, believe that renovations to particular components
will yield substantive benefits to the health care system. Re-designing
and re-building means a more radical change is in order, with govern-
ments seeking ways to create a health care system very different from the
one which they inherited.
Among western European nations a variety of measures have or are
being introduced, most of which introduce competition into previously
centralized systems (Beveridge type) or strengthen the forces of compe-
tition in pluralistic systems (Bismarck type.) A common feature of the
7. B. Able-Smith, Cost Containment and New Priorities in Health Care: a Study of the
European Community (Aldershot: Avebury Ashgate, 1992).
8. OECD, supra note 4.
9. T. Ensor, "Health System Reform in Former Socialist Countries of Europe" (1993) 8 Int.
J. Health Plann. & Management 189; World Bank, Investing in Health, World Development
Report (New York: World Bank/Oxford University Press, 1993); C. Collins, D. Hunter &
A.Green, "The Market and Health Sector Reform" (1994) 8 J. Manag. Med. 42; C. Collins,
A. Green & D. Hunter,"International Transfers of National Health Service Reforms: Problems
and Issues" (1994) 344 Lancet 755.
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reforms taking place in Beveridge - type health care systems is the stated
desire to retain the universal, comprehensive, tax - financed base. What
has changed is the way in which health care is organized and delivered.
Competition is seen as the key to improved efficiency, although the
concept of competition varies from country to country.
In many of the Beveridge health care systems, the key to the reform
process is the 'purchaser provider split'. There are many variations of this
concept, but in essence, it requires the creation of two agencies in which
one (the purchaser or budget holder) negotiates a contract with the other
(the provider of a service or services). In this approach, the purchaser,
usually the health authority (United Kingdom) or the local authority
(Nordic countries), is no longer responsible for the direct delivery of
health care and instead is given an allocation or operating budget with
which to buy health care from a variety of providers. Providers are
hospitals and others who compete for funds from purchasers and may be
either publicly or privately owned. This form of provider or supply-side
competition is at its most advanced in the United Kingdom, but Finland,
Italy, Spain and Sweden are experimenting with similar mechanisms.' °
A fundamental feature of the reforms is the introduction of greater
patient choice. This takes a variety of forms ranging from changes to the
mechanism for paying general practitioners through increased capitation
payments (Denmark, United Kingdom), to performance-related pay
(Finland, Sweden), to linking hospital income to the ability to attract
patients (Sweden). The common element in all of the schemes is the
notion of competition. As Saltman observes, it is the use of "private
market incentives to change hospital and physician behaviour to improve
productivity, efficiency and responsiveness to patients.""
A variety of reforms are taking place in Bismarck health care systems.
Although they may appear to be less radical than the reforms in Beveridge
and Semashko systems, they are no less fundamental. Bismarck - type
systems are concerned with strengthening cost control or cost contain-
ment measures or both, through the introduction of tighter or tougher
regulations, providing a more visible and central role for government, or
10. E. Tragakes & M. Vienonen, "Health Care Reforms on the European Scene" (Paper
presented to the joint WHO(EURO) at the IGSF Workshop on Assessment of the Productivity,
Efficiency and Quality of Health Care Systems, Kiel, 22-25 November 1994); Health Care
Reforms in Europe, supra note 2; C. Ham, "The Background" in C. Ham, ed., Health Care
Reform: Learningfrom International Experience (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997)
[hereinafter Health Care Reform] at 1-20.
11. R. B. Saltman & C. von Otter, Planned Markets and Public Competition (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 1992) at 123.
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enhancing existing competitive measures by improving customer choice.
For example, Belgium has concentrated on controlling expenditure
through greater government involvement (regulation) and the require-
ment that insurers now negotiate directly with providers over fees and
charges. Germany has attempted to contain costs by replacing the fee
for service system with capitation and service level payments and by
making it easier for individuals and organizations to change sickness
funds. 3 The Netherlands has opened the health care system to greater
competition; providers compete for insurance funding, and insurers (both
private and public) compete for insurees thus enhancing customer choice."
These changes parallel those occurring in Beveridge health care
systems.They differbecause they require little or no structural change to
implement since many of the reforms are concerned with strengthening
regulatory measures. As a result they are less visible than the health sector
reforms elsewhere in Europe.
III. The Health Care Market
In many respects the introduction of market mechanisms into the health
care systems of Europe stems as much from the prevailing ideology of the
1980s, as it does from perceived inherent weaknesses in their health care
systems. This dogmatic approach to social policy development can be
traced to the influence of a number of economists, primarily American,
who argue that excessive bureaucracy and overtly interventionist govern-
ment stifle economic development and directly contribute to inefficient
and ineffective social policies. 5 The market approach is judged to be a
better mechanism for regulating the delivery of health care because of
factors such as competition between providers and purchasers, public
choice of providers, and individual responsibility. 6 Thus the discipline
inherent in market mechanisms is seen as being the preferred prescription
for treating the diagnosed ills of national health care systems."
12. Supra note 7.
13. F. W. Schwartz& R. Busse,"Germany" in Health Care Reform, supra note 10 at 104-118.
14. Health Care Reforms in Europe, supra note 2; Tragakes & Vienonen, supra note 10;
A.deRoo, "Contracting and Solidarity: Market-Oriented Changes in Dutch Health Insurance
Schemes" in R. B. Saltman & C. von Otter, eds., Implementing Planned Markets in Health Care
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995).
15. M. Friedman & R. Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
1981).
16. Collins, supra note 9.
17. A. Enthoven, Reflections on the Management of the National Health Service (London:
Nuffield Provincial Hospitals' Trust, 1985); A. Enthoven, "Managed Competition in Health
Care and the Unfinished Agenda" (1986) Annual Supplement, Health Care Financ. Rev.,
105-119.
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The acceptance by many politicians of the views of free-marketers
such as Friedman, coupled with the necessity of containing public
expenditure, led countries such as Britain and the Netherlands, in particu-
lar, to introduce elements of competition into their health care systems.
The rationale for this radical change was the belief that the discipline
associated with having to compete for patients and resources would result
in greater efficiency. A form of managed competition was introduced.
Managed competition seeks "to appropriate the benefits of increased
efficiencies in health care provision emerging from competitive mecha-
nisms, into an altered framework of publicly operated health care sys-
tems."' 8 While the ownership of the health care system has not changed
in western Europe, competition is now used to maximize services and
benefits for a given level of resource. In central and eastern Europe a
different set of factors has pushed countries towards a more mixed
economy of health care facilities, in which competition is a key feature.19
Two types of managed competition appear to have emerged: mixed
markets, and public competition." In mixed market form of managed
competition, both publicly and privately owned institutions (providers)
compete for custom. Institutions compete for contracts to provide a
specified range or type of service or both. The contracting process is
based on "real" prices (the actual cost to the provider of the service), and
contracts are subject to monitoring by the purchaser and may be open to
re-negotiation. Patients are essentially passive players in this process as
services are purchased on their behalf, and providers generally are
accountable only through the contract process. Their power remains
largely intact and providers are able to exert considerable influence on the
contracting process.2
There are a number of features of public competition. One is that
providers are organized as "public firms": namely, they are publicly or
state owned and are able to operate much like a private firm. They can
establish their own organizational structures, negotiate salaries and
conditions of service for their employees and determine the range and
scale of services they wish to provide. The state (in theory) generally
plays a minimalist role vis-A-vis these institutions. Patient choice deter-
mines the budgets of these "public firms" and, consequently, the salaries
paid to employees. The institutions compete for patients but, unlike the
18. Tragakes & Vienonen, supra note 10 at 19.
19. Saltman & Figueras, supra note I at 5-38; G. Zarkovic et al., Reform of the Health Care
Systems in Former Socialist Countries: Problems, Options, Scenarios (Neuherberg: Institut
fur Medizinische Informatik und System Forschung, 1994).
20. See Saltman & von Otter, supra note II for a more complete discussion of these concepts.
21. Supra note 11.
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mixed market model, money follows the patient. Thus to be successful,
"public firms" must pay particular attention to customers' preferences.
Failure to do so could lead to severe financial consequences. Another
crucial feature of public competition is the role of politicians. Politicians
become guardians and facilitators of the system. The responsibility of
politicians is threefold: to establish the pricing systems for remunerating
providers; to monitor the implementation of the policy through public
opinion; and, to retain control over large scale capital investment in the
health system.22
It is difficult, if not impossible, to characterize the health care reforms
in one country or another as either of the mixed market or public
competition archetypes. However, developments in Britain 3 and to
some extent the Netherlands 24 are said to epitomize the mixed market
approach, whereas developments in Denmark and Sweden 25 are more
akin to the public competition model. 26 Whatever the version being
pursued, it is evident that the changes occurring in health care systems
throughout Europe are moving those systems towards a form of managed
competition,27 and thus are an important factor in the apparent conver-
gence of health systems.
IV. Converging Tendencies - The Development
Two general trends in health systems reform can be discerned: increasing
pluralism allied with the introduction or expansion of market mecha-
nisms; and, the shift from a wholly collectivist and universal tax-based
funding of the health system towards a form of health insurance and its
associated emphasis on individual entitlement. In western Europe, re-
22. Ibid.
23. See H. Glennerster, "Internal Markets: Context and Structure" and A. Maynard, "Internal
Markets and Health Care: A British Perspective" in M. Jerome-Forget, J. White & J. Wiener,
eds., Health Care Reform Through Internal Markets: Experiences and Proposals (Montreal
& Washington: The Institute for Research on Public Policy and The Brookings Institute, 1995)
at 17-25 and 27-47 for an interesting and, at times, contradictory view of health care markets
in Britain.
24. W.P.P.M. van de Ven & F. Schut, "The Dutch Experience with Internal Markets" in
Jerome-Forget et al, eds., ibid. at 95-117.
25. C. Rehnberg, "The Swedish Experience with Internal Markets" in Jerome-Forget et al.,
eds., ibid. at 49-73.
26. C. Ham & C. Brommels,"Health Care Reform in the Netherlands,Sweden and the United
Kingdom" (1994) 13 Health Affairs 106-119; A. Anell, "Implementing Planned Markets in
Health Care: the Case of Sweden" in Saltman & von Otter, supra note 11 at 209-26.
27. Tragakes & Vienonen, supra note 10.
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forms largely embrace the first trend, whereas in central and eastern
Europe both trends are key features of health sector reform.
8
Table 3 outlines the main characteristics of the reforms being intro-
duced into Beveridge -type health care systems. Although a wide variety
of measures are evident, a common pattern can be detected: the market
oriented nature of the reforms. In Denmark, for example, the key
elements of health system reform are decentralization, competition, and
public choice. In other words, the introduction of specific market mecha-
nisms into the health care system. Indeed, in one form or another, this is
feature of the health reforms in Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Two exceptions to the trend appear to
be Ireland and Norway, both of whom have tightened rather than relaxed
central control. 29
Few Beveridge - type countries have sought to widen the financial base
for health care. In the past, prior to health care reforms, Ireland and
Portugal encouraged their citizens to take out private health insurance as
an alternative or supplement to the state - funded health system. Other
countries have been reluctant to shift the cost of health care more directly
onto the individual. Recently though, Ireland has sought to transfer part
of the responsibility for health care onto the individual through an
increase in user charges or fees. The increase in user fees, however, has
been counter-balanced with an extension in coverage by the national
health system, thus lessening the dependency of the individual on
voluntary private health insurance. The issue of user fees and co-
payments is returned to below.
It is evident from Table 3 that different aspects of the market are being
applied in different countries, with many increasing or enhancing the
pluralistic nature of the health care system. This trend is being pursued in
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. In the
remaining countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, the agen-
cies providing health care are solely located in or financed by the public
sector. A feature that is common to most of the countries in Table 3 is the
introduction of policies and mechanisms to promote patient choice and
competition between providers. The preferred procedure in the United
28. T. Ensor, supra note 9; G. Zarkovic et al., supra note 19.
29. There is considerable debate in the literature about whether or not market mechanisms
have led to greater decentralization or re-centralization of the health care system. See R. B.
Saltman, "Patient Choice and Patient Empowerment in Northern European Health Systems: a
Conceptual Framework" (1994) 24 Int. J. Health Serv. 201-229 [hereinafter "Patient Choice"];
see also "Reorganizing the System: Decentralization, Re-centralization and Privatization" in
Saltman & Figueras, eds., supra note I at 43-58 for an informed discussion of the issues.
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Kingdom is the introduction of competition between service suppliers for
health sector funds-the ubiquitous purchaser provider split. 0
Sweden is the country most associated with public competition,
whereas the United Kingdom is the vanguard for the mixed market. While
there have been a number of experiments in contracting out elements of
the public health services to private providers in Sweden,31 it is the
transformation of hospitals into public firms which has generated particu-
lar interest. The hospitals remain publicly owned but instead of receiving
an annual budget from a county council they earn their revenue through
contracts with primary care providers (who have been given responsibil-
ity for purchasing hospital services for their patients), and from patients
exercising their preferences. Patients can determine the hospital to which
they will be referred and these referrals directly affect the hospital's
operating budget, since the budget is directly tied to the number of
patients they treat. 32
The health care reform processes implemented in Bismarck - type
health systems complement those in the Beveridge type systems. The
changes in the Bismarck systems (Table 4) are primarily designed to
enhance the pluralistic nature of the systems and to strengthen existing
competition between suppliers. An interesting feature of these reforms is
the tendency to introduce a variety of regulatory procedures or mecha-
nisms designed to control or curtail some of the adverse aspects of
competition. Many of the new measures are directed at cost containment
with governments assuming a greater degree of control or influence than
previously.
An example of new cost containment measures is fixed national
budgets for hospitals in Belgium along with efficiency measures which
penalize hospitals for the under-utilization of specialist services.3 3 In
Germany, hospitals now receive a negotiated budget based on the
previous year's activity. In 1995 this negotiated budget was replaced by
a system of payment by diagnosis. The government's aim is to have
strong sickness funds competing for members, and it is providing
incentives to encourage the funds to amalgamate.3 4 The move to paying
30. C. Ham, "The United Kingdom" in Health Care Reform, supra note. 10.
31. Supra note 11.
32. R. B. Saltman, "Competition and Reform in the Swedish Health System" (1990) 68
Milbank 597-618; "Patient Choice", supra note 29; C. Rehnberg, "Sweden" in Health Core
Reform, supra note 10.
33. B. Able-Smith & E. Mossialos, "Cost Containment and Health Care Reform: a Study of
the European Union" (1994) 28 Health Policy 89-132.
34. Ibid.
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hospitals by diagnosis and the introduction in 1996 of an annual free
market between sick funds suggests that in Germany, competition is seen
as the best mechanism for constraining health care expenditure."
France has pursued a strategy of cash - limited budgets for public
hospitals, introduction of budget caps for certain expenditures in private
hospitals, the closure of under utilized beds in both public and private
hospitals, and an increase in the contribution paid by the public for health
care services .3 6 The French health care system, of all the Bismarck types,
probably is the most liberal and market - oriented as patients have
freedom of choice of a general practitioner. There are few restrictions on
where a doctor can set up practice, and the majority work in private
practice. There is also strong competition for patients between the public
and private hospital sectors.37 The French reforms have concentrated on
improving hospital efficiency, containing expenditure on health care, and
rationalizing the provision of public and private services. The French,
unlike some of their European counterparts, have not chosen to address
some of the inherent operational and managerial issues associated with
leaving the liberal and pluralist aspects of the system unchecked.38
Regulatory cost containment measures introduced over the years by
successive governments in the Netherlands have not been very effective.
The Dekker Committee, set up to review the Dutch health care system,
attributed the failure of such measures to the existence of few incentives
to improve the efficiency of the services, a fragmented financing system
for health care, and very poor coordination between providers and
purchasers.39 Thus with the publication of the Dekker Committee report,
and the subsequent report by the Dunning Committee , the Dutch
government began to explore ways of restructuring the health care
system.
The Dekker report had at its core the twin objectives of encouraging
and enhancing competition between and within the insurance and pro-
vider markets. The proposal for one basic health insurance package for
everyone, paid for by income-related premiums, was central to the
35. F. W. Schwartz & R. Busse, "Germany" in Health Care Reform, supra note 10.
36. Supra note 33; S. Bach, "Health Care Reforms in the French Hospital System" (1993)
8tnt. J. Health Ptann. & Management 169-87.
37. Bach, supra note 36.
38. Ibid.
39. The Dekker Committee, Changing Health Care in the Netherlands (Netherlands:
Ministry of Welfare, Health and Cultural Affairs, 1988).
40. The Dunning Committee, Choices in Health Care: A Report by the Government
Committee on Choices in Health Care (The Hague: Ministry of Welfare, Health and Culture,
1992).
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achievement of these objectives. Coverage for health care outside the
basic package could be obtained through voluntary supplementary insur-
ance. These and the other reforms outlined by the Dekker Committee
encountered strong political opposition as the government pursued their
implementation. In response the government established the Dunning
Committee which published its report in 1992. 41 The Dunning Commit-
tee, in essence, endorsed the market - oriented approach outlined in the
Dekker Report, but went further by articulating a set of criteria which
would govern which services would be classified as being part of the
basic package and which would not. At the present time the reforms
described by both the Dekker and Dunning Committees are bogged down
in the labyrinthine Dutch policymaking process with no clear indication
of the tone or nature of the outcome.42
The reasons underlying the health care reforms being pursued by the
old Semashko countries are similar to those in the other types of health
care systems in Europe (Table 5). The countries of central and eastern
Europe differ from those of western Europe in that they are going through
the painful (both economically and socially) process of redefining the
role of the state in the aftermath of the collapse of state-socialism, 43 and
the nearly wholesale dismantling of all manifestations of the now
discredited previous system.' They are also under pressure from West-
ern governments, donor agencies and global organizations such as the
World Bank to introduce market economies and decentralize the public
sector.
45
The nature, speed and implementation of the reform of the health care
system in central and eastern Europe varies from county to country, a
legacy of each country's different and, in some cases, faltering approach
to the transition from state socialism. 46 A further fundamental factor
which has inhibited the reform process in some countries and distorted it
in others is the economic crisis which has accompanied and often
41. Ibid.
42. C. van Etten & G. Okma,"Health Care Reforms in the Netherlands" in Artundo et. al. eds.,
supra note 15; W.P.P.M. van de Ven, "The Netherlands", in Ham, ed., supra note 10.
43. A. Preker & R. Feacham, Searching for the Silver Bullet: Market Mechanisms and the
Health Sector in Central and Eastern Europe (Washington: The World Bank, 1995).
44. G. Moon, "The Territorial Restructuring of State Socialist Health Care Systems: The
Case of the Czech Republic" (Paper presented to the Sixth International Symposium on
Medical Geography, 1994) [unpublished].
45. P. Musgrove, "Investing in Health: The 1993 World Development Report of the World
Bank" (1993) 27 Bulletin of the Pan American Health Organization 284; Collins et al., supra
note 9.
46. Zarkovic et al., supra note 19.
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undermined the transition.17 In spite of the differences in progress
between countries, two clear trends can be discerned: first, a shift from
comprehensive, universal, state - owned and state - financed health care
towards a decentralized social/health insurance system based on a payroll
tax and individual entitlements; and second, a move towards pluralistic
and market - oriented replacement structure.48 Table 5 outlines the main
features of the health sector reforms being proposed or implemented in
selected central and eastern European countries. The table clearly con-
firms the trends documented by Ensor,49 although they are by no means
universal, except for the introduction of varying forms of insurance -
based funding measures. Thus, the health system model which most
countries are considering or in the process of implementing is primarily
Bismarck in construction.
50
These general trends apart,there are some significant differences in the
various models of health care being developed in central and eastern
Europe. Some countries such as Belarus are following the model pio-
neered in St Petersburg which gives a global budget based on capitation
to the polyclinics 5' who operate much like fundholders52 in Britain
whereby they pay the hospitals for treating those patients which they
refer. It appears that few countries are adopting the St Petersburg model;
indeed, developments in St Petersburg indicate that the polyclinics will
no longer be purchasers of hospital care.5 1 Polyclinics, which were an
important feature of the Semashko model, are now not regarded as being
a particularly useful form of providing primary care. Several countries
such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and Russia are seeking to introduce a
British style of general practice where people register with a particular
doctor who is remunerated partly by capitation fee and partly by fee-for-
service payments. The objective is to encourage the establishment of
family-style medicine where the doctor knows the patients and the
patients know the doctor. In Russia, for example, polyclinics were paid
47. "Rejoined: A Survey of Eastern Europe" The Economist (13 March 1993) 11.
48. Ensor, supra note 9.
49. Ibid.
50. Zarkovic et al, supra note 19.
51. J. Roberts, "Winter in Leningrad" 100 Health Serv. J. 18 at 19.
52. "Fundholders" is the term used in Britain to describe those general practitioners who have
applied for and received practice budgets with which to purchase non-emergency secondary
and tertiary care services for those patients registered with the practice. For a detailed
discussion of Fundholding, see H. Glennerster, H. Matsaganis & P. Owens, Wild Card or
Winning Hand? Implementing Fundholding (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1994).
53. S. Curtis, N. Petukhova & A. Taket, "Health Care Reforms in Russia: The Example of
St.Petersburg" (1995) 40 Soc. Sci. and Med. 755 at 765.
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on the basis of their potential capacity, physicians were salaried, and
tended to refer patients to the hospitals instead of treating them in the
polyclinics. The doctors in the polyclinics were specialists, not general-
ists in the tradition of western general practitioners. Thus the treatment
given and the care offered was often off-hand and impersonal, the
opposite of the general practitioners model. 54
Co-payments or user fees are a major feature of the new health care
systems. This may in part be in response to the dire economic situation in
central and eastern Europe. It may also be a recognition that 'baksheesh' -
under the table payment to facilitate treatment - is common place in most
countries of central and eastern Europe. Introducing user changes is just
making legitimate what was previously illegal.
A further interesting feature of the health systems reforms in central
and eastern Europe is that with few exceptions, the changes are either
indicative of the mixed market model or the public competition model.
Albania, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland and Romania are
introducing reform measures that seek to introduce supply-side compe-
tition. The reforms taking place in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Slovenia
seem to emulate aspects of the public competition model, especially the
emphasis on competition for patients. There are a few countries such as
Estonia, Hungary and Russia which appear to be introducing elements of
both forms of managed competition.
V. Converging Tendencies - The Implications
A common feature of the health systems reforms in Europe is the
introduction or strengthening of competition. A basic premise of the
managed competition approach is that it will deliver more efficient and
effective health care. Increased competition between hospitals or insurers
for patients or customers, it is argued, will force them to become more
efficient and also to improve quality by paying greater attention to patient
needs. There are two inter-related aspects of the move towards demand-
driven reforms which have major implications for health care. These are
the move from prospective funding in the form of global budgets and
capitation fees, to retrospective remuneration through competition based,
fee-for-service payments, and the resulting impact that such changes will
have on equity.
5
54. A. Telyukov & D. Rowland, "A Soviet Health Care from Two Perspectives" (1991) 70
Health Aff. 71 at 86.
55. J. Ovreteit, "Values in European Health Care Markets: Choice, Equity and Competition"
(1994) 4 Eur. J. Pub. Health, 294 at 300.
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Changing to a form of remuneration which is grounded in competition,
as already indicated, has certain attractions for governments; among
these are greater consumer choice and a more efficient use of resources.
However, this approach often leads to financial and geographical in-
equality and economic inefficiency.5 6 Competition -based remuneration
can have a number of negative and positive consequences. The benefits
of competition have been discussed earlier. The difficulties include
matters such as provider - induced demand which could result in unnec-
essary diagnostic and therapeutic procedures; adverse selection or "cream
skimming" whereby insurers or providers or both continue to exclude
high risk, high demand patients in order to minimize risks and maximize
earnings or profits; the monopolistic tendency for providers to form
strategic alliances or to merge, thus potentially benefiting from econo-
mies of scale while maintaining or increasing prices; the high cost of
managing a more fragmented system; and the marketing costs associated
with operating in a competitive environment. 7
An even more fundamental flaw is that, in the health care market, the
concept of consumer choice-the essence of competition-is unwork-
able. Consumers' knowledge of health and health care issues, it is
generally agreed, is insufficient to enable them to make informed deci-
sions. 8 Thus health care consumers are largely reliant on varied vested
interests when it comes to making important decisions about health or
medical care. Given this, and taking into consideration the constraints
outlined above, there is a strong argument for governments to retain a
major role in policy making. Introducing competition into health care
does not absolve governments from the responsibility for regulating
health and medical care practices and monitoring the quality of care
available.5 9 This issue will be returned to below.
Changing the basis of remuneration through competition also im-
pinges upon equity. One of the most significant design features of both
the Beveridge and Semashko health care systems was that both were
comprehensive in coverage, universal in enrolment, and free at the point
of delivery. Few Bismarck type health care systems are able to make this
56. The Reform of Health Care, supra note 6; S. Banoob, "Private and Private Financing-
Health Care Reform in Eastern and Central Europe" (1994) 15 World Health Forum 329 at 334.
57. R. B. Saltman, "Thinking About Planned Markets and Fixed Budgets" in F. W. Schwartz,
H. Glennerster & R. B. Saltman eds., Fixing Health Budgets: Experience from Europe and
North America (London: J. Wiley, 1996).
58. Banoob, supra note 56; P. Shackley & A. Healey, "Creating a Market: An Economic
Analysis of the Purchaser-Provider Model" (1993) 25 Health Policy 153 at 168.
59. Banoob, supra note 56; H. Maarse, State Intervention in Health Care: Aspects, Effects
and Prospects [unpublished].
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claim.' As health care systems become more pluralistic in nature and
competitive processes determine service provision, the implications for
equity could be profound.
As member states of the European Regional Office of the World
Health Organization, all the countries of Europe have endorsed the
principles of Health for All and, through an acceptance of the Regional
Office's 38 targets, have agreed to be accountable for their perfor-
mance.61 Health for All is predicated on two core concepts: equity and
health gain. Equity is defined in terms of reducing inequities within and
between member states and is held to be a fundamental component of any
health care system. Health gain, in the WHO context, is about adding life
to years, adding years to life, and adding health to life.
Competition and cost-containment, or more precisely cost-shifting
measures, threaten to undermine the Health for All concept. A feature of
many health systems reform measures is to shift some of the cost of health
care onto the consumer. A favourite is the introduction of, or increase in,
co-payment or user charges. While it is true that such contributions do
lead to improved cost-consciousness among the public, they do have a
highly inequitable distributive impact. 61 So too do measures which seek
to encourage health care customers to supplement through voluntary
private insurance the package of benefits available from the compulsory
or state - controlled scheme. Such measures are regressive as they
discriminate mainly against those in greatest need. Moreover, as Tragakes
and Vienonen note, "the growing use of voluntary insurance contributes
to the risk of developing a two-tier health care system, particularly in
situations where legislation does not clearly delineate the respective
responsibilities and obligations of compulsory and voluntary health
insurance ."63
A further feature of the insurance -based health reforms in central and
eastern Europe is that the new health care package often is no longer
comprehensive in scope nor universal in coverage. The irony for many
people in these countries is that benefits of the new system, unlike the old,
are not available to all; people are excluded on the grounds of cost,
eligibility and geography. In short, the new is far more inequitable than
60. Tragakes & Vienonen, supra note 10.
61. Regional Office for Europe, Targets for Health For All: Targets in Support of the
European Strategy for Health for All (Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 1985);
Regional Office for Europe, Targets for Health for All The Health Policy for Europe
(Copenhagen: World Health Organization, 1992).
62. R. Evans, M. Barer & G. Stoddart,"The Truth About User Fees" (1993) 14 Policy Options
4; Tragakes & Vienonen, supra note 10.
63. Ibid. at 27.
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the old ever was. The healthy benefit to the detriment of the sick, the
wealthy are advantaged relative to the poor, with the consequence that the
sick, if poor, are in double jeopardy.'4
None of this instills great confidence that the reform process will lead
to significant health gain (enhanced health status) for the population. This
raises the fundamental question about the purpose of health systems
reforms in Europe. The rationale for reform is not uniform for all
countries but, the reforms seemed to have two key features: improved
efficiency in the use of resources and greater customer choice of services,
with competition regarded as the best vehicle for achieving these aims.
The truism that the "proof of the pudding is in the eating," is very apposite
with regard to the reforms. Tragakes and Vienonen65 fear that the
common overriding concern to control costs-focusing on "means"-
inevitably has caused policy makers to lose sight of the real goal, the
achievement of health gain. The end result may well be leaner, fitter and
more efficient health care systems which, while greatly improving the
health status of some-the affluent and the healthier members of soci-
ety- nevertheless exacerbate inequities and diminish the health status of
the rest of the population .
66
Many of the health systems reforms taking place in Europe are founded
on a minimalist role for the state. Certainly the reforms in Britain have
been driven in part by an ideology that questions the effectiveness of state
intervention. 67 It is a pattern which is being repeated throughout Europe
as countries "reconsider the optimal public/private mix in health care."
6
The broad consensus in Europe that social justice linked with economic
growth equalled prosperity, which gave rise to the welfare state, has been
all but shattered by the recent economic slowdown. This has resulted in
an increasingly strident political debate between those who advocate a
rolling back of public responsibilities and those who argue for continuing
high levels of social protection.69 Many European countries currently
have governments which are converts to the gospel of the market. They
are advocates either on ideological grounds, or in the case of some central
and eastern European countries, dependent upon international financial
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. For a detailed discussion on and related issues, see chapter 5 "Allocating Resources
Effectively" in Saltman & Figueras, supra note 1.
67. M. Goldsmith & D. Willetts, Managed Health Care: A New System For a Better Health
Service (London: Centre for Policy Studies, 1988).
68. J. Frenk, "Dimensions of Health System Reform" (1994) 27 Health Policy 19.
69. Tragakes and Vienonen, supra note 10.
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support from agencies such as the World Bank to help them turn around
their largely bankrupt infrastructure. They are therefore forced by neces-
sity to follow a pre-determined path.7"
Maarse in a review of the effects of state intervention on health care
considers the likely impact of health sector reforms on the role of the state.
His analysis leads him to conclude that it would be an "error to argue that
health care reform is generally aimed at less government."'" He cites two
principal reasons in support of his position. The first is based on the
assumption that a crucial if not the prime purpose of the reforms is to
contain costs. In Maarse' s view only through strong state intervention can
the goal of cost containment be realized. Empirical findings clearly
indicate that as the share of public expenditure on health care rises, per
capital expenditure on health care declines,72 and that efforts to reduce
supply are more effective than those designed to curtail demand.73
Secondly, the empirical evidence suggests that market forces are ineffec-
tive in containing costs. As Maarse asserts, in the marketplace sustained
growth is what counts and not cost containment. Thus he concludes that
the state has a fundamental role to play in health care and that the reform
process should result not in less government but in better government.74
Maarse's argument is that the state must determine the policy dimen-
sions within which the reform of the health care system takes place, a view
endorsed by Saltman.7" The overriding objectives of the reforms must be
those which "protect solidarity and equity, and link the development of
organizational and financial mechanisms to improvements in overall
health status."76 If the state is not prepared to make these a priority, it is
most unlikely that the other important players in the health care system
will step into the breach. One need look no further than the United States
health care system for an example of this type of negative role model.7
Many of the health care reforms being introduced are based on an
almost blind faith that the new approach will work.78 Wholesale changes
are undertaken without any attempt to set up procedures to monitor the
effects, so absolute is this belief in the paradigm. There are very real
70. Collins, et al., supra note 9.
71. Maarse,supro note 59.
72. U. Gerdtham, et al., "An Econometric Analysis of Health Care Expenditure: A Cross-
Sectional Study of OECD Countries" (1992) l1 J. Health Econ. 63.
73. Able-Smith, supra note 7.
74. Maarse, supra note 59.
75. R.B. Saltman, "Balancing State and Market in Health System Reform" (1997) 7 Eur. J.
Pub. Health 119 at 120.
76. Tragakes & Vienonen, supra note 10.
77. B. Kirkman-Liff, "The United States" in Ham, eds., supra note 10.
78. Collins et al., supra note 9.
602 The Dalhousie Law Journal
dangers in such myopic policy making. All the available evidence which
might suggest that the new reforms are either flawed or based on false
premises, is, at best, ignored or, at worst, attacked as being irrelevant. In
consequence, policies may be implemented which will do more harm
than good. Whitehead, for example, argues that some of the policy
changes designed to engender competition in the British National Health
Service have been successful but only at a considerable cost in terms of
both access and equity.79
Another consequence of adopting reform measures without careful
evaluation is the replacement of the perverse incentives (said to be a
feature of the old system) with a new set of such incentives. Collins et al. °
cite contracts based on process targets, rather than on outcome targets.
Another concem is that the focus of the health care system will shift
towards efficient service delivery and away from the pursuit of health
itself.
Perhaps the most disturbing feature of the ideology that has driven
much of the reform, especially of Beveridge health systems, is the
discounting of the high transaction costs associated with the reforms. In
the Bismarck systems associated transaction costs may or may not be so
great a factor. It appears, however, that few systematic attempts are being
made to measure the extent to which expectations fit with reality.8
Conclusion
There are both advantages and disadvantages associated with the health
systems reform measures. Many of the reforms are predicated on the
grounds that what is being implemented will be better than what it
replaces. Few procedures are being put in place to test whether or not this
is true. In some of the central and eastern European countries,in particular
the Czech Republic and Hungary, the financial impact has been particu-
larly severe as a result of the switch from a centrally controlled and funded
health care system to one based on health insurance founded on the notion
of managed competition .
8 2
79. M. Whitehead, "Who Cares About Equity in the NHS?" (1994) 308 Br. Med. J., 1284 at
1284-287.
80. Collins et al., supra note 9.
8 1. The debate about the progress of implementation and the effects of the health system
reform process is addressed in some detail in chapters 7 and 8 of Saltman & Figueras, supra
note 1.
82. Banoob, supra note 56.
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The convergence of health systems reforms in Europe towards man-
aged competition is predicated on the assumption that competition is the
best vehicle for delivering efficient, high quality health care. Unfortu-
nately, the market is not the perfect mechanism that economic theory
suggests. Otherwise there would be no need for governments and other
agencies to intervene through regulations to curb unacceptable aspects
and practices. As Maarse eloquently argues, health reform should not be
about reducing the role of the state but about changing the role of the state
for the better.83 There is limited evidence that this may be one feature of
the health system reforms in western Europe,84 though Collins and
colleagues have their doubts." The prime objective of the changes taking
place in central and eastern Europe would seem to be lesser government,
not better government involvement in health care. There is a very real
danger that the drive towards deregulation, privatization and increased
individual responsibility will not lead to better health care for all, but to
a widening disparity between the affluent and the poor. Under managed
competition, it seems that equity is being sacrificed for efficiency.
The hypothesis of this paper was that the various health system reforms
being implemented in Europe are leading towards convergence in the
form of managed competition. Ham undoubtedly is correct to state that
one should not "exaggerate the extent of convergence,"86 nevertheless,
the wholesale embrace of managed competition as the only solution to the
universal problem of Europe' s under-achieving health care systems, may
not produce the hoped -for panacea. Health care reform is too important
to be subjected to the whims of ideological dogma .1 If this short - sighted
approach persists, the consequences could be tragic for health systems
reforms.
83. Maarse, supra note 59.
84. Saltman, supra note 75.
85. Collins, supra note 9.
86. Ham, supra note 10 at 12.
87. In the World Health Organization publication, European Health Care Reform (1997),
supra note I, the penultimate chapter describes a model for effective implementation which,
if followed, could assist countries in avoiding many of the pitfalls that hitherto have plagued
health system reforms.
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TABLE 2
PERFORMANCE OF EUROPEAN HEALTH SYSTEMS
SELECTED HEALTH INDICATORS
MODEL POP PER HEALTH LIFE INFANT
PHYSICIAN' SPENDING2  EXPECTANCY MORTALITY4"
(% GNP) 3  AT BIRTH4a
BEVERIDGE
DENMARK 358 6.30 76 7
FINLAND 380 7.82 76 5
GREECE 259 5.39 78 9
IRELAND 588 7.72 76 7
ICELAND 353 8.34
ITALY 193 7.54 78 7
NORWAY 298 7.35 77 7
PORTUGAL 403 6.99 75 9
SPAIN 246 6.59 78 7
SWEDEN 393 8.79 79 5
UNITED KING. 667 6.11 77 5
BISMARCKIAN
AUSTRIA 307 8.38 77 6
BELGIUM 267 7.50 77 6
FRANCE 387 9.40 77 7
GERMANY 312 8.73 77 6
NETHERLANDS 391 8.03 78 6
SWITZERLAND 299 7.52 78 6
SEMASHKO
ALBANIA 729 4.0 73 27
BULGARIA 298 5.36 71 14
HUNGARY 248 5.95 69 16
POLAND 440 5.07 71 13
ROMANIA 531 3.87 70 23
RUSSIAN FED 241 1.41 68 20
CROATIA 486 72 9
SLOVENA 489 73 7
CZECH REPUB 324 5.94 71 7
SLOVAKIA 336 - 71 12
MACEDONIA 458 - 72 24
ESTONIA 319 3.62 69 16
LATVIA 330 3.87 69 7
LITHUANIA 255 3.58 70 7
1. Data is from 1994-1995; source: World Health Statistics annual as featured in G.T.
Kurian, The Illustrated Book of World Rankings (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1997).
2. Public health expenditures.
3. Data is from 1994-1995; source: Human Development Report as featured in Kurian,
note 1.
4. Source: World Health Report 1997: Conquering Suffering and Enriching Humanity:
Report of the Director General (Geneva: WHO, 1997).
4a. 1996 Data.
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TABLE 3
HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM IN SELECTED
BEVERIDGE-TYPE COUNTRIES
MAIN FEATURES
DENMARK - open competition between public hospitals
- patient choice of hospital via general practitioner referrals
- considering giving general practitioners budgets for purchas-
ing non-emergency hospital services
FINLAND z capitation based funding for local authorities
" detailed 5 year plans abolished
- competition between providers likely
- greater freedom of choice of personal general practitioner
GREECE z- restrictions on private hospitals removed
- governmental committee established to plan reform of
health system
IRELAND - income-related extended coverage of national health system
- increase in user fees/co-payments
- capitation payments replace fee-for-service
ITALY - general managers and self-governing hospitals
z- private hospitals reimbursed on fee basis from public funds
teaching and specialist hospitals part funded by fees
- limited competition between hospitals
NORWAY - pilot of DRG based funding for hospitals
- resource allocations to countries related to hospital
performance
- greater central control over resources
SPAIN - patient choice of general practitioner
- proposal for health areas to become purchasers
public health units to become self-governing (autonomous)
contracts with both public and private health sectors
SWEDEN : experiments with productivity incentives for general
practitioners
experiments with productivity related and patient preferen-
tial funding for hospitals
- capitation funding for health centres
UNITED purchaser/provider split - contractual relationship
KINGDOM - competition among providers, public and private for needs
based contracts
general practice fundholders as purchasers of secondary care
competition among general practitioners for patients
re-imbursement via capitation, plus fee-for-service
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TABLE 4









focus on cost-containment and quality
encourage growth of non-profit sector
integration of health and social care areas
z fixed national (global) budgets for hospitals
stronger role for government in controlling expenditure
- insurers (mutualites) negotiate fees and charges
with providers and share burden of cost-containment
introduction of private insurance
- increase in user fees/co-payments
hospital reform to give public hospitals similar benefits to
private hospitals and subject latter to similar cost controls
affecting former
'- doctors to be paid by capitation and 'service complex'
payment instead of fee-for-service
- sick funds allowed to pool risks to narrow differences in
contribution rates
- incentives for sick funds to amalgamate
annual competition for members
basic (national) compulsory universal insurance
- competition between private insurers and sickness funds
- central (government) control of contributors
z insurer led competition among providers
- risk-adjustment payments to insurers to reduce adverse
selection
- mandatory risk compensation payments among
insurance companies
capped increases in annual insurance premiums
- per diem charge for hospitalization
z move towards fixed annual budgets
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TABLE 5
HEALTH SYSTEM REFORM IN SELECTED COUNTRIES










right to free health care abolished - certain user
charges allowed
law on health insurance in preparation
private health sector permitted
national health insurance fund proposal
per capita funding of polyclinics who pay hospitals
for referrals
fund holding general practitioners being considered
compulsory national health insurance fund - primarily
payroll tax funded
hospitals compete for patients and for contracts from
insurance fund
general practitioners paid by capitation and fee-for-service
private health sector permitted
general health insurance scheme funded by part taxation,
part contribution
privatization of most health care institutions
fee-for-service and 'point scheme' re-imbursement
free choice of physician and health care facility
necessary care (undefined) covered by insurance scheme
regional sickness funds - payroll tax based
universal entitlement with some co-payments
local competition between providers
national fee schedule
regional sickness funds (some support from centre)
funded by payroll tax
competition between hospitals, polyclinics
mainly comprehensive with some restrictions
(eg dental care)
compulsory health insurance for basic services, payroll
tax funded '
voluntary insurance for non-basic services
private health sector encouraged
competition for patients
